Abstract-We address the problem of generating provably-safe conflict resolution maneuvers for aircraft in uncertain environments. We assume that a maneuver is composed of a sequence of flight modes, which are segments of constant heading, of constant bank angle, or of constant airspeed. Each of these flight modes has associated to it the kinematics of the aircraft, and hence the maneuver is a hybrid system. While the flight modes are defined ahead of time, their sequencing and parameter values do not necessarily have to be. We present an algorithm for generating provably safe maneuvers, which is based on a general procedure for designing controllers for hybrid systems. The result is a maneuver, proven to be safe within the limits of the models used, which is a familiar sequence of commands easily executable by the flight management systems. The maneuvers may be viewed as protocols, or "rules of the road", and are well-defined for each conflict scenario. We present results for two example maneuvers.
Two new technologies for air traffic control will be certified for use in the cockpit in the very near future: a positioning system based on GPS, and a data communication network linking aircraft to each other and to the ground control system, called ADS (Automatic Dependent Surveillance), or ADS-B (-Broadcast). Both of these technologies will have the effect of moving today's ground-based navigation and communication equipment into the air. These technologies are expected to provide short term improvements; they will not provide a long term solution to the air traffic problem.
The result is a perceived need in the air traffic, airline, and avionics communities for a new architecture, which integrates new technologies for data storage, processing, communications, and display, into a safe and efficient air traffic management system. The airlines are proponents of a decentralized architecture featuring free flight, meaning that each aircraft plans and tracks its own dynamic trajectory with minimal interference from ATC [7] . Many view this as a radical solution, but a recent study funded by NASA [8] suggests that distributing some of the control authority to each aircraft would help improve the efficiency of the system as a whole. While the degree of decentralization and level of automation in a new air traffic management system are still under debate (since it is very difficult to estimate the increase in efficiency from distributing the control authority), the integrity of any automated functionality in a new air traffic management system depends on a provably-safe design, and high confidence that the control actions will not fail.
A. Conflict Detection and Resolution
Because any scheme, centralized or decentralized, which guides multiple aircraft from origin to destination airports is subject to uncertainties and disturbances, a method for the advance detection and consequent resolution of conflicts is a crucial system in an ATM architecture. Currently, air traffic controllers perform this function of separation assurance, but recent studies by NASA suggest that automating separation assurance will open up what is now the most serious bottleneck in the system [9] . Consider a system of aircraft, each navigating using a combination of GPS and INS, and each providing surveillance information through an ADS link with ATC, and an ADS-B link with neighboring aircraft. Each aircraft is surrounded by two virtual cylinders, the protected zone and alert zone. The radius and height of the protected zone depends on the FAA separation standards; the size and shape of the alert zone depends on various factors including airspeed, altitude, accuracy of sensing equipment, traffic situation, aircraft performance and average human and system response times. A conflict or loss of separation between aircraft occurs when their protected zones overlap. The system of aircraft is defined 1524-9050/01$10.00 ©2001 IEEE to be safe if the aircraft trajectories are such that their protected zones never overlap.
Conflict prediction and resolution have been sources of interest for the air traffic and control communities in recent years. Probabilistic approaches [10] - [12] assume a motion model which incorporates stochastic uncertainty in the measured information, and using this the probability of conflict is computed. Other stochasticapproachesincludethatof [13] ,whichdevelopsanalerting logic based on dynamic models with uncertainty and determines the probability of conflict using Monte Carlo simulations. Spatial and temporal approaches, such as those of [14] - [16] calculate the four dimensional coordinates of a possible conflict. In [17] , the authors present an algorithm for reducing computational complexity in conflict detection by grouping aircraft trajectories together according to spatial and temporal separation. In [18] , the authors pose aircraft conflict resolution as a multiple objective numerical optimization problem and solve several examples, while in [19] , the authors present an algorithm which computes optimalmaneuversformultipleaircraftsystems,usingananalytic differential geometric approach. In [20] , the authors introduce the idea of mode-based conflict resolution, in which resolution maneuvers for each aircraft involved in a conflict are designed by automatically sequencing together flight modes, which are segments of constant heading, of constant bank angle, or of constant airspeed, familiar to pilots and easily implementable by autopilots.Theproblemofcontrollinganaircrafttosuchatrajectoryplan is a hybrid one: it involves designing both the continuous control laws for the aircraft within each flight mode as well as the method for sequencing the discrete modes together.
Hybrid system theory has evolved at the intersection of the computer science and control communities, in response to a growing need for methods which analyze and verify complex, safety-critical systems. A hybrid system involves the interaction of discrete event and continuous time dynamics, with the purpose of proving properties such as reachability and stability. The continuous dynamics model the physical processes, such as the continuous response of an aircraft to throttle, aileron, elevator, and rudder. Often, as in the case of multiple-aircraft conflict detection and resolution, the systems are high-dimensional continuous state systems which can be simplified by representing a set of behaviors as a single discrete state or mode with simplified continuous dynamics. As such, a hybrid system is a continuous state system with switches [21] , in which the switches have a defining logic which may be modeled by a discrete transition system. In [22] - [24] , we have developed a method for analyzing and proving the safety of hybrid systems. We translate safety specifications into restrictions on the system's reachable sets of states. Then, using analysis based on two-person zero-sum game theory for automata and continuous dynamical systems, we derive the optimal control laws, and the differential equations whose solutions describe the boundaries of unsafe sets. As long as the system remains outside of the unsafe set, then it is "provably safe".
We believe that these hybrid system techniques address the need for robust analytic methods for conflict resolution. As we show in this paper, the techniques provide explicit bounds on the state and input variables of each aircraft, for any configuration of aircraft, so that the maneuver is guaranteed to be safe.
B. Outline of the Paper
We address the problem of generating provably-safe dynamic conflict resolution maneuvers for aircraft, in uncertain environments. We simplify the trajectory planning problem by assuming that each aircraft's maneuver is composed of a sequence of flight modes. Each of these flight modes has associated to it a simplified kinematic model which is guaranteed to be dynamically implementable. While the flight modes are defined ahead of time, their sequencing, as well as their parameter values, do not necessarily have to be. We then present an algorithm for generating provably safe conflict resolution maneuvers, which is based on our controller synthesis technique for hybrid systems. As an example, we consider the lateral axis kinematics of a commercial aircraft. We define a set of four flight modes, corresponding to either constant or variable velocity and heading. For a pair of these aircraft, we numerically compute the "minimal unsafe operating region" for a given maneuver, and the corresponding control law to keep the aircraft outside of this operating region. The result is a maneuver, proven to be safe within the limits of the models used, which is a familiar sequence of commands easily executable by the flight management system. The maneuvers may be viewed as protocols, or "rules of the road", and are well-defined for each conflict scenario. We conclude with some examples.
The algorithm that we propose may be executed either on board each aircraft, or in an ATC TRACON or ARTCC facility on the ground. We assume that the algorithm has access to the (perhaps uncertain) state and intent information of the aircraft involved in the conflict (through the GPS/INS system linked to the ADS/ADS-B communications), to information about the aerodynamics and performance characteristics of the aircraft, and to information about the constraints imposed by the global traffic flow.
II. MODELING CONFLICT RESOLUTION MANEUVERS AS HYBRID SYSTEMS
With the goal of designing conflict resolution schemes which are provably safe, we present in this section a hybrid automaton model [25] for two-aircraft conflict resolution at fixed altitude. Hybrid automata are systems which exhibit both continuousstate dynamics, modeled by differential or difference equations, and discrete-state dynamics, modeled by finite state machines. In the conflict resolution problem, the trajectories of each aircraft are assumed to be sequences of flight modes, in which each flight mode has associated to it the continuous dynamics of the composite aircraft system. We specify the safety property that we would like the system to maintain, and we show how we can represent this property as a subset of the state space of the system. The section is concluded with two example maneuvers.
A. Aircraft Conflict Resolution Models
The lateral axis kinematics of an aircraft (aircraft ) in inertial coordinates is given by:
(1) where velocity along direction in body axes; velocity along direction in body axes; bank angle; heading angle of the aircraft; rate of change of heading. We use the notation to indicate a desired value. Our goal is to design conflict-free trajectories for each aircraft in a system of aircraft; a conflict occurs when a pair of aircraft incur a lateral spacing of less than 5 nautical miles. Consequently, we surround each aircraft with a 2.5 nautical mile radius disk to represent the protected zone.
We assume that each aircraft's desired trajectory is a finite sequence of segments, each corresponding to one of four flight modes.
• Mode 1-Velocity and Heading Hold: In which the aircraft flies straight and level with a given constant velocity and a constant heading .
• Mode 2-Velocity Capture, Heading Hold: In which the aircraft flies straight and level with a constant heading and a velocity profile which is a pre-determined function of time.
• Mode 3-Velocity Hold, Heading Capture: In which the velocity is held at a prescribed constant value and the heading is a pre-determined function of time.
• Mode 4-Transition Mode: In which velocity and heading are both pre-determined functions of time. In each of the modes we set the desired sideslip velocity, , to 0.
It is easy to justify the use of this simple kinematic model and mode set. In [26] , we use a standard 12 DOF nonlinear dynamic model and derive the autopilot control laws (and bounds on and ) which guarantee that solutions of the kinematic model (1) are dynamically implementable under the constraints of each of the modes.
In this paper, we consider conflict resolution between two aircraft . Let represent the relative position and orientation of aircraft 2 with respect to aircraft 1. In terms of the absolute positions and orientations of the two aircraft, for , it may be verified that , and thus
The protected zone of aircraft 2 may be translated to the origin of this relative frame. Thus, for safety of the maneuver, the relative position must remain outside of the interior of the 5 mile radius disk centered at the origin:
B. Hybrid Automata and the Safety Property
The conflict resolution model presented in the previous section exhibits both discrete-state dynamics, through the logic of switching between flight modes, as well as the continuous-state evolution of the aircraft in each flight mode. We present in this section a compact mathematical representation of such a system, called a hybrid automaton, which is useful for both system representation, as well as verification and synthesis of control laws.
A hybrid automaton, as shown in Fig. 1 • is a finite collection of discrete input variables, where is the set of discrete control inputs, and is the set of discrete disturbance inputs; • is the set of continuous input variables, where is the set of continuous control inputs, and is the set of continuous disturbance or uncontrollable inputs; we denote the spaces of input (disturbance) trajectories as the sets of piecewise continuous functions ( respectively), which take values in ( respectively); • Init is a set of initial states; • is a vector field describing the evolution of for each ; is assumed to be globally Lipschitz in (for fixed ) and continuous in ; • Inv is called an invariant, and defines combinations of states and inputs for which continuous evolution is allowed; • is a reset relation, which encodes the discrete transitions of the hybrid automaton.
Safety of the hybrid automaton is encoded in an "illegal" or unsafe subset of : the system is safe if it never enters . Remark 1: We refer to as the state of and to as the input of . Remark 2: The control actions model those inputs over which the designer has control, and the disturbance actions model inputs over which the designer has no control, such as uncertainties in the actions or behaviors of the other aircraft in the system. We assume that the designer has complete knowledge of the bounds on these disturbance actions . In collision avoidance problems, we typically want to design a maneuver for one of the vehicles given uncertainty in the actions of the other vehicles. For example, to model the aircraft conflict resolution problem of the previous section as a hybrid automaton, we would proceed as follows: the discrete states are flight modes where each is one of Modes 1-4, and the continuous state is ; the discrete input set is used to represent controllable transitions between modes, while is used to represent uncontrollable transitions between modes; the set of continuous control inputs is the set of linear and/or angular velocities of one of the aircraft, , while the continuous uncontrollable or disturbance inputs represent the linear and/or angular velocities of the other aircraft, ; we assume the initial states are , meaning that the system starts out in a safe state; is given by (2) with and either fixed or varying depending on the mode; the reset relation encodes allowable mode switches, as a function of state and inputs; and finally, the Invariants are used to enforce mode switching.
In the following sections, we will present two different conflict resolution maneuvers, based on different sequences of flight modes.
C. Maneuver 1: Three-Mode Conflict Resolution
Consider the maneuver illustrated in Fig. 2 , with the protocol of the maneuver defined as follows: the aircraft are nominally in Mode 1, at a certain relative separation distance each aircraft turns to its right, follows an arc of a circle in Mode 3 until it intersects its original trajectory, then turns to its left and returns to its desired trajectory. The model allows instantaneous changes in heading, which is an obvious abstraction of the true aircraft dynamics. In each mode, the continuous dynamics may be expressed in terms of the relative motion of the two aircraft (2): in Mode 1, for and in Mode 2, for . We assume that both aircraft switch modes simultaneously, so that the relative orientation is constant. This assumption simply allows us to display the state space in two dimensions, making the results easier to present. The problem statement is therefore: generate the relative distance between aircraft at which the aircraft may switch safely from Mode 1 to Mode 3, and a turning radius in Mode 3, to ensure that the 5 nautical mile separation is maintained.
The dynamics of the maneuver can be encoded by the hybrid automaton of Fig. 3 , where corresponds to Mode 1 before the maneuver, corresponds to Mode 3 "avoid mode", and corresponds to Mode 1 after the avoid maneuver has been completed. There is one discrete control input , such that the switch from to triggers the transition from to . The transition from to is required to take place after the aircraft have completed a half circle: note that with , for , it takes time units to complete a half circle. The continuous state space is augmented with a timer to force this transition. Let . At each transition, both aircraft change heading instantaneously by radians; we represent this with the standard rotation matrix Rot . As discussed in the previous section, we assume that is controllable, and is the disturbance input with known bounds. Safety is defined in terms of the unsafe set : (5) which encodes the fact that the two aircraft should never come within 5 nautical miles of each other.
D. Maneuver 2: Seven-Mode Conflict Resolution
We now consider a second maneuver which is a more complicated yet realistic model of commercial flight trajectories: straight lines of variable speed connected by arcs of circles of constant speed, as shown in Fig. 4 . In this case, when the two aircraft come within a certain distance of each other, each aircraft starts to turn to its right, following a trajectory which is a sequence of straight line segments and arcs of circles, corresponding to Modes 2 and 3. We again assume that both aircraft switch modes simultaneously, so that the relative orientation is constant. We also assume that the geometry of the maneuver is Fig. 3 . In q both aircraft follow a straight course, in q a half circle, and in q both aircraft return to a straight course. Fig. 4 . Two aircraft in a maneuver made up of Modes 2 and 3. In discrete states q ; q ; q ; and q , the aircraft are in Mode 2 , and in states q ; q ; and q the aircraft follow arcs of circles corresponding to Mode 3 with heading a linear function of time. In this example, for simplicity of presentation, the initial relative heading (120 ) is preserved throughout.
such that the straight path of is at a angle to the straight path of , and that of is at a 45 to that of . The length of each arc is fixed at a prespecified value, and the length of the trajectories in and are equal to each other, but unspecified. The problem statement is therefore: given some uncertainty in the actions of the aircraft, generate the relative distance between aircraft at which the aircraft may switch safely from to , and the minimum lengths of trajectories in and , to ensure that the 5 nautical mile separation is maintained.
The dynamics of this maneuver can be modeled by the automaton of Fig. 5 . The flight management system of aircraft 1 predicts the velocity of aircraft 2 up to some uncertainty, and computes the parameter , which indicates the relative distance at which the maneuver must be initiated, and the dwell time in and to ensure separation is maintained. Thus, there is one discrete control input , such that the switch from to triggers the transition from to , and one continuous control input . Since its value is uncertain, is considered a continuous disturbance input. The ensuing transitions are required to take place after certain periods of time have elapsed: the continuous state space is augmented with a timer to force these transitions. Let . Similar to the previous example, the unsafe set is represented as (6)
III. SYNTHESIS OF SAFE MANEUVERS
In the previous section, we presented a model for two-aircraft conflict resolution, in which the actions of one aircraft are uncertain with respect to the other. Because conflict resolution maneuvers for each aircraft must guarantee safety for the worst possible uncertainty of the other aircraft, we compute the set of feedback control laws which protect against this worst case uncertainty. With most realistic systems, the designer has a model of the environment and its actions: thus the better the model, the more flexibility the designer has in choosing a control law. Using the optimal control law for worst case uncertainty, we compute the maximal safe subset of the hybrid state space for a particular maneuver.
This technique for verifying and synthesizing controllers for hybrid systems is presented in detail in [24] , [25] . The method is summarized here: we first present the technique for continuous systems with no mode switches, and then we generalize the method to hybrid systems. Finally, we apply the technique to the conflict resolution maneuvers of the previous section.
A. Synthesis of Conflict Resolution Maneuvers with No Mode Switches
Consider a two-aircraft conflict with no mode switching: the dynamics of the system evolve according to (2) with safety encoded by the relative protected zone (3). We pose the conflict resolution problem as a game between control and uncertainty: the control wins if it can keep the state outside of for all ; conversely, the disturbance wins if it can drive the system into .
We define the value function of this game, over horizon , where , as such that (7) which is interpreted as the cost of a trajectory which starts at at initial time , evolves according to (2) with input , and ends at the final state , with cost . This choice of value function, which only depends on the final state, encodes the binary state of safe or not safe, at the final state. Using standard techniques in optimal control theory [27] and dynamic games [23] , [28] , one can show that the optimal control and worst disturbance are given by:
where is the vector field given by the right hand side of (2), and represents the gradient of . The optimal value function evolves according to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation: (10) where . To ensure that states which are unsafe at a given time do not become safe at a later time, we impose the condition [24] : (11) Thus, if at a given time , , yet for a later time , , then the interpretation is that the state will remain safe (outside the protected zone ) for at least seconds, however, there is a disturbance which could drive the system into in at most seconds.
Safe and Unsafe Sets of States:
Denote by the unsafe subset of the state space at any given time ,
This is the set of all states which is backward reachable from in at most seconds. The safe set of states is given by the complement of . Safe Control Law: The control law which renders the system safe is one in which the optimal control must be used on the boundary of the unsafe set ; inside the interior of the safe set, any control law, such as one optimized according to a performance criterion, may be used.
Conflict Resolution by Speed Change Only: Consider the dynamics (2) in which , the velocity of aircraft is the control input, with bounds , and the velocity of aircraft 2 is the disturbance input, with bounds . Then it can be shown that the optimal control and worst disturbance are 
With the initial unsafe set defined as in (3), and example parameters given as the normalized values:
we compute the unsafe set of states shown in Fig. 6 as . The computation of this example and those below is performed using a method based on level set techniques for boundary propagation [29] , which is developed in [24] , [30] . This computational technique has been shown ( [30] ) to produce numerically accurate solutions in up to three continuous state dimensions, for any number of discrete states. 
Conflict Resolution by Heading Change Only:
If angular velocities are used as control variables, then the reachable set extends into the dimension. For example, for aircraft speeds , and angular velocities and , we compute the unsafe set of states shown in Fig. 7 .
B. Synthesis of Hybrid Conflict Resolution Maneuvers
We now consider the two-aircraft conflict with mode switching, using the model given in Section II-B. We start by defining two discrete operators: the controllable predecessor of the reset relation, , and the uncontrollable predecessor, . The range of will be used to describe those states for which there exists a control action such that, for all disturbance actions, the system remains outside of the growing unsafe set for at least one discrete transition; conversely, the range of will be used to describe those states which can be forced by a disturbance action to transition into the unsafe set. For an arbitrary set :
The controllable predecessor can be used as an "escape set": if the state trajectory can be pushed into the controllable predecessor before it is forced into either the unsafe set or an uncontrollable predecessor of the unsafe set, then the system can switch to instantaneous safety in another discrete mode. Therefore, when computing backward reachable sets of states in hybrid systems, it is necessary to be able to compute sets of states which are backward reachable from the unsafe set, while avoiding this "escape set". For this, we define a new operator, called Reach. For arbitrary sets :
Reach and such that and for (14) where is the continuous state trajectory in mode . The set Reach describes those states from which, for all , there exists a , such that the state trajectory can be driven to while avoiding an "escape" set .
Safe and Unsafe Sets of States:
The construction of the minimal unsafe set then proceeds as follows: initialize with , and iterate:
In the first step of this algorithm, we add to all states from which there is a disturbance forcing the system either inside or to states from which a disturbance action may cause transitions into , without first touching the set of states from which there is a control action keeping the system outside . The safe set of states is given, at every step of the iteration, as the complement of the unsafe set.
A step of the algorithm, in discrete state , iteration is shown in Fig. 8 . Each step in the iteration involves computing the controllable and uncontrollable predecessors of the previous iterations' unsafe set, and then, in each discrete state, computing those states which reach , avoiding . Safe Control Law: As with the continuous state example in the previous section, this algorithm prescribes a control law which renders the system safe, which is a continuous control law as well as a discrete switching policy. The control law will be described in the context of the example in the next section.
C. Maneuver 1: Three-Mode Conflict Resolution
Applying the maneuver synthesis method of the previous section to the three-mode conflict resolution example of Figs. 2 and 3, gives results as shown in Fig. 9 . Each of the twelve graphs in Fig. 9 is a plot in the axes, with each of the four rows representing an iteration of Algorithm (15) , and the three columns corresponding to discrete states and . Algorithm (15) is initialized (row 1) with the set , which is shown as the dark shaded disks. The light shaded region in is : Fig. 10 . As ! is decreased, the unsafe set shrinks. Fig. 11 . Simulating examples of (a) following the safe control policy, and (b) violating the safe control policy, both shown in inertial coordinates.
since there is only one controlled transition in this model (from to ), is only defined in . Algorithm (15) continues for three iterations, when a fixed point is reached, shown in the fourth row of Fig. 9 . The dark shaded region in the fourth row, first column of Fig. 9 is the most interesting: it is a plot of the unsafe set of states in . As long as the relative position of aircraft 2 with respect to aircraft 1 is not inside this region, then there exists a control policy such that the conflict is resolved. The control policy may in general be determined from this fixed point, and is summarized below:
• If the relative position of aircraft 2 with respect to aircraft 1 is on the boundary of the dark shaded region, then the optimal continuous input must be applied; away from this boundary, any control input may be applied; • If the relative position is inside the unshaded (white) region, then switching instantaneously will lead to a conflict; the aircraft must remain in until the relative state enters the light shaded region, then either switch to , or remain in . The width of the unbounded portion of the unsafe set is controlled by the radius of the turn in , and can be removed entirely by making the radius large enough (shown in Fig. 10) .
The results described above may be illustrated with the simulation shown in Fig. 11 . If the aircraft follow the safe control policy dictated by Algorithm (15), as they do in Fig. 11(a) , then conflict is resolved; if the aircraft violate this policy (Fig. 11(b) ) then conflict occurs.
D. Maneuver 2: Seven-Mode Conflict Resolution
For the seven-mode maneuver of Figs. 4 and 5, the fixed point in (after seven iterations) is shown in Fig. 12 , for varying radii of Mode 3, varying dwell times in the avoid maneuver segments, and fixed linear velocity in each of the maneuver legs. The results are, not surprisingly, similar to that of the fourth row, first column of Fig. 9 for the three mode maneuver; the different shape is due to the additional modes. These results indicate that the parameters of the maneuver may be designed to minimize the unsafe set, and are comparable to those of Fig. 10 . The effect of mode switching may be illustrated by comparing the unsafe set of this maneuver with the unsafe set of Fig. 6 (which was computed for the case of no mode switching). If mode switching is allowed, the unsafe set becomes bounded.
The results of this section illustrate a few key points. The first is that it is not sufficient to prescribe a conflict resolution maneuver topology, and then show through simulation that the maneuver is "safe": the simulation executed in Fig. 11 illustrates that a maneuver with small perturbations in its parameters can Fig. 12 . Three different fixed points shown: comparing three different parameter sets for the seven-mode maneuver. The base maneuver (left sub-plot) has normalized angular velocity of 1 rad/sec in each curved segment, and the two straight segments last 1 second (normalized time) each. The dashed lines show the unsafe set without switching (Fig. 6 ).
switch from "safe" to "unsafe". Second, analysis (instead of simulation) may be used to prove safety to within the limits of the models used; furthermore, analysis can often give surprising results, leading to cases that one might not have thought to simulate. Finally, using hybrid automata to model conflict resolution maneuvers naturally models existing flight modes, and a hybrid system controller synthesis technology is easily applied to the two-aircraft conflict problem.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method for synthesizing safe conflict resolution maneuvers for aircraft. The method is based on a hybrid system model and analysis technique, which generates safe sets and control policies and thus allows safety proofs for ranges of initial conditions and system uncertainties. We illustrated the technique with two examples, and showed that it is not sufficient to simply simulate different conflict resolution techniques to illustrate their safety.
Our current research focuses on extending these techniques to higher dimensions. There are no theoretical barriers to increasing the dimensionality of these problems, yet there is a computational one. We have successfully implemented the hybrid system reachable set computation on three dimensional continuous examples using level sets [30] , yet the computational burden increases exponentially with the continuous dimension. We are currently investigating techniques to ease this burden, using projections, over-approximations, and parallel computation.
Conflict resolution has traditionally been considered a pairwise problem: yet there has been little research into the "domino" effect resulting from using a pairwise algorithm in a multiple aircraft environment. Protocols or "rules of the road" may be defined just as easily for groups of more than 2 aircraft, yet proofs of safety become more complex. Results of safety proofs for a three aircraft "roundabout" (proposed in [20] ) are presented in [31] .
In addition, we are currently using hybrid system and game theoretic techniques in two other important areas of automated air traffic systems: automatic mode switching in autopilots [32] , and in computing "no fly zones" in Closely Spaced Parallel Approaches (CSPA) into airports [33] .
